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Abstract
With the rapid spread of various mobile terminals in
our society, the importance of secure positioning is
growing for wireless networks in adversarial settings.
Recently, several authors have proposed a secure posi-
tioning mechanism of mobile terminals which is based
on the geometric property of wireless node placement,
and on the postulate of modern physics that a prop-
agation speed of information never exceeds the veloc-
ity of light. In particular, they utilize the measure-
ments of the round-trip time of radio signal propaga-
tion and bidirectional communication for variants of
the challenge-and-response. In this paper, we propose
a novel means to construct the above mechanism by
use of unidirectional communication instead of bidi-
rectional communication. Our proposal is based on
the assumption that a mobile terminal incorporates a
high-precision inner clock in a tamper-resistant pro-
tected area. In positioning, the mobile terminal uses
its inner clock and the time and location informa-
tion broadcasted by radio from trusted stations. Our
proposal has a major advantage in protecting the lo-
cation privacy of mobile terminal users, because the
mobile terminal need not provide any information to
the trusted stations through positioning procedures.
Besides, our proposal is free from the positioning er-
ror due to claimant’s processing-time fluctuations in
the challenge-and-response, and is well-suited for mo-
bile terminals in the open air, or on the move at high
speed, in terms of practical usage. We analyze the
security, the functionality, and the feasibility of our
proposal in comparison to previous proposals.
1 Introduction
In the past decade, we have witnessed the succes-
sive emergence of various mobile terminals includ-
ing mobile-phones, PDAs, handheld gaming devices,
non-contact IC cards, RFID tags, and GPS receivers.
They have pervaded and dramatically changed every
aspect of our daily life in such a short time. As the
mobile terminals became widespread, manufacturers
made great efforts to meet urgent requirements of the
market needs, and have made outstanding progress in
key hardware technologies such as miniaturization of
embedded components, lifetime extension of batteries,
and sensitivity improvement of receivers.
Today, the most popular wireless positioning sys-
tem is perhaps the civilian GPS service, which is orig-
inally designed to provide location information from
trusted satellites to exposed receivers in nonadversar-
ial settings. Because all positioning procedures are
presupposed to be legitimate by honest entities, the
civilian GPS service has intrinsic vulnerabilities even
to the most common attacks known as the imperson-
ation attack, the modification attack, or the replay
attack. In contrast, the military GPS service is secure
against the impersonation attack and the modification
attack by the external adversaries, thanks to encryp-
tion of GPS signals. But the service is only available
to the United States military with their secret keys,
and moreover, even the military GPS service is not se-
cure enough to defend against the replay attack when
it comes to location authentication.
A present RFID system also has security vulnera-
bilities on identification and location authentication
especially to the replay attack, though expected to be
a powerful tool for the product and commodity man-
agement. It is desirable for RFID tags to be equipped
with a reliable security function for location authen-
tication in the light of application demands to ensure
the traceability of RFID tags in logistics and trans-
portation systems. It is no exaggeration to say that
all current services utilizing location information of
wireless nodes, including those above, do not have au-
tonomous mechanisms to exclude illegitimate location
information without direct surveillance of the nodes
by trusted parties.
Recently, several authors have proposed an innova-
tive mechanism for wireless secure positioning where
all illegitimate location information can be excluded
automatically [1] [2]. Their mechanism is based on
two fundamental facts: The first is the geometric re-
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lation of distances of a point contained within a trian-
gle to triangle’s vertices (for 2D planar positioning),
or the geometric relation of distances of a point con-
tained within a tetrahedron to tetrahedron’s vertices
(for 3D spatial positioning). The second is the pos-
tulate of modern physics that a propagation speed of
information never exceeds the velocity of light. In par-
ticular, the authors utilize the measurements of the
round-trip time of radio signal propagation and bidi-
rectional communication for variants of the challenge-
and-response.
The proposal in [1], however, has a vulnerability to
the replay attack in the man-in-the-middle scenario,
and needs a minor modification to prevent the imme-
diate rebinding of the used session in the challenge-
and-response to the false round-trip latency. Mean-
while, the proposal in [2] realizes wireless secure posi-
tioning by incorporating the distance bounding proto-
col introduced in [3] into a proposed verification tech-
nique called Verifiable Multilateration.
In this paper, we propose a novel means to con-
struct the above mechanism by means of unidirec-
tional communication instead of bidirectional com-
munication used in the previous proposals. We as-
sume that a mobile terminal incorporates a verifica-
tion module as a verifier and a high-precision inner
clock in a tamper-resistant protected area, and that
the module and the inner clock are protected even
from a mobile terminal user. In our proposal, the mo-
bile terminal uses its inner clock and the time and lo-
cation information broadcasted by radio from trusted
stations for positioning.
A similar authentication mechanism for unidirec-
tional communication is found in [4] as Temporal
Leashes where both sender and receiver use their
tightly synchronized clocks to estimate the traveling
distance of radio signals. But the proposal is origi-
nally designed to detect the specific attack called the
wormhole attack by checking that the traveling dis-
tance of the received packet is below the predeter-
mined upper limit. On the other hand, our protocol
does not need any predetermined limit through pro-
cedures, but need to include precise location informa-
tion of the senders into radio signals for the receiver
to calculate receiver’s own location. Thus, Temporal
Leashes [4] has significant differences in its purpose
and usage from our protocol.
Our proposal has a major advantage in protecting
the location privacy of mobile terminal users, because
the mobile terminal need not provide any informa-
tion to the surrounding stations through positioning
procedures, thanks to unidirectional communication.
Besides, our proposal is free from the positioning error
due to claimant’s processing-time fluctuations in the
challenge-and-response. Our proposal does not need
complex key management, and is well-suited for mo-
bile terminals in the open air, or on the move at high
speed, in terms of practical usage.
Our proposal depends largely on the advanced hard-
ware technologies such as a high-precision small size
clock and a tamper-resistant module. But after exam-
ining the present level of clock manufacturing tech-
nologies, our hardware requirements are considered
feasible and will be materialized in a relatively short
period of time, though they are still challenging at
this moment.
The organization of this paper is the following. In
Section 2, we propose our protocol for wireless secure
positioning. In Section 3, we analyze the security of
our proposal in comparison to the previous proposals.
In Section 4, we discuss functional advantages of our
protocol. In Section 5, we discuss the feasibility of our
proposal. In Section 6, we review related works. We
conclude this paper in Section 7.
2 Protocol Description
We propose our protocol for secure positioning on the
two dimensional plane as Fig. 1. A digital signa-
ture for authentication in Fig. 1 can be replaced with
a message authentication code (MAC), but an addi-
tional measure is necessary for secure secret-key dis-
tribution between a verification module and stations.
We can easily modify the 2D planar positioning pro-
tocol in Fig. 1 for secure 3D positioning in a simi-
lar fashion to [1] [2]. In the modified 3D positioning
protocol, we need at least four, not three, valid time
and location information broadcasted by radio from
trusted stations, where the validity of each broad-
casted information is verified with the time of receipt,
an appended digital signature, and station’s authentic
public key. In the final domain verification step, the
module verifies that receiver’s location computed by
triangulation is contained within a tetrahedron, in-
stead of a triangle, spatially formed by four trusted
stations.
3 Security Analysis
3.1 Distance Bounding
We will discuss the security of our protocol in terms of
the distance bounding in comparison to the previous
proposals in [1] [2].
Distance bounding protocols are first introduced in
[3], which technically guarantees the distance upper-
bound of a device to a verifier by the measurement of
the round-trip time of the radio signal propagation.
The protocols [3] are based on the fact that by the
forced delay of the radio propagation, an adversary
in the man-in-the-middle attack can make a device
2
1. A trusted station Si (i = 1, 2, 3, . . .) com-
putes a digital signature sign
si
(tsi ,xsi)
with Si’s private key for the future broad-
casting time tsi and Si’s location xsi at
the time tsi .
2. Si broadcasts tsi ,xsi , and signsi(tsi ,xsi)
by radio at the time tsi .
3. A tamper-resistant verification module M
in a mobile terminal receives broadcasts
tsi ,xsi , signsi(tsi ,xsi) (i = 1, 2, 3, . . .) all
at once, and at the same time, obtains
the time of receipt tm from the tamper-
resistant inner clock. If the number of
received broadcasts is less than three, M
aborts the protocol.
4. M checks that tsi ≤ tm for all i of the
received broadcasts. If the result is false,
M aborts the protocol.
5. M verifies sign
si
(tsi ,xsi) with Si’s authen-
tic public key. If the result is true, M ac-
cepts tsi ,xsi . Otherwise, M rejects them.
If the number of accepted broadcasts is
less than three, M aborts the protocol.
6. With tm and all accepted tsi ,xsi , M com-
putes M’s location xm by applying an ap-
propriate optimization method to trian-
gulation, and also estimates xm’s error
range.
7. M checks that xm’s error range is within
the preset limit. If the result is false, M
rejects xm.
8. M verifies that there exists a set of three
accepted xsi which forms a triangle con-
taining xm. If the result is true,M accepts
xm. Otherwise, M rejects it.
Fig. 1: 2D planar positioning protocol with simplex
radio communication
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Fig. 2: Distance bounding with bidirectional commu-
nication [3]. mi is claimant’s nonce and αi is verifier’s
nonce. The verifier estimates the upper bound of a
distance to the claimant with the round-trip time of
rapid bit exchanges. After the rapid bit exchanges,
the claimant signs a concatenation of αi and βi for all
i with his private key, and sends it to the verifier.
¨©ª«¬­® ¯°±²³´µ¶·¸¹º
»¼½¾¿ÀÁÂÃ
ÄÅÆÇÈ
ÉÊ ËÌ
ÍÎÏÐÑÒ ÓÔÕ Ö×ØÙ ÚÛ
ÜÝÞßàáâ
ã
ä
åæçèéêëìí îï
ðñò óôõö
÷
ø
ùúûüýþß

 


	



 
ff fiflffi !"#
Fig. 3: Distance bounding with unidirectional com-
munication. The station signs the sending time ts and
station’s location xs with his private key, and broad-
casts them. The mobile terminal estimates the upper
bound of a distance to the station with ts and the time
of receipt tm. The mobile terminal then computes its
location with three sets of the distance upper bound
and xs.
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look further away from a verifier than it truly exists,
but cannot make it look closer in principle because no
information can propagate faster than light.
Other than the simple forced delay attack, we will
consider two major attacks for the security of the dis-
tance bounding below. In Fig. 2 and 3, we see the
distance bounding protocol with duplex radio commu-
nication [3] and the one with simplex radio communi-
cation in our protocol. Note that a verifier indicates
a trusted station in the original protocol [3] and the
previous proposal [2], whereas in our proposal a veri-
fier indicates a tamper-resistant module with an inner
clock incorporated into a mobile terminal.
3.1.1 Impersonation Attack
In this subsection, we analyze the security of distance
bounding protocols under the impersonation attack.
We define the impersonation attack as a situation
where an adversary impersonates another by falsify-
ing authentication information to fool a certain legit-
imate entity. More specifically, we consider a situa-
tion where the adversary falsifies necessary raw data
to compute mobile terminal’s time and location, and
tries to make the verifier believe the false time and
location information as true. The adversary may be a
malicious third party, or a malicious user of the mobile
terminal.
In the case of [3] [2], if the adversary falsifies mobile
terminal’s location by the fake challenge-and-response
in the man-in-the-middle attack, the verifier can de-
tect the attack by verifying the committed random
number and the submitted digital signature in the
last step. The detection succeeds with overwhelming
probability as long as the adopted signature scheme
is secure and claimant’s committed random number
is kept secret from the adversary until the challenge-
and-response between the adversary and the verifier
is completed.
In case of our proposal, if the adversary makes up
the arbitrary time and location information, the ver-
ifier can detect the attack by verifying the appended
digital signature. The detection succeeds with over-
whelming probability as long as the adopted signature
scheme is secure.
3.1.2 Replay Attack
In this subsection, we analyze the security of distance
bounding protocols under the replay attack. We de-
fine the replay attack as a situation where an adver-
sary repeats the past valid information to deceive a
certain legitimate entity. More specifically, we con-
sider a situation where an adversary eavesdrops on
the valid communication between a trusted station
and a mobile terminal, and fraudulently reuses the
past communication to convince the verifier of the va-
lidity of the false time and location information. The
adversary may be a malicious third party, or a mali-
cious user of the mobile terminal.
In [3] [2], if the adversary fraudulently reuses the
past valid exchange between a claimant and a ver-
ifier, the verifier can detect the attack by verifying
the submitted digital signature in the last step. The
success probability of the detection is overwhelmingly
high as long as verifier’s random number is renewed
in each challenge-and-response.
Even if the adversary fraudulently reuses the past
valid communication, our proposal still upper bounds
the distance of the mobile terminal to the station. Be-
cause the time of receipt issued by the tamper-proof
inner clock is necessarily later than the past valid time
of receipt, the adversary can only lengthen the esti-
mated distance of the mobile terminal to the station,
but cannot shorten it.
The proposal in [1] has a vulnerability to the re-
play attack in the man-in-the-middle scenario. In the
attack, an adversary adjacent to Location Manager
eavesdrops on the message from Device to Location
Manager containing nonces and encrypted Device’s
ID, and also eavesdrops on the exchanged nonces be-
tween Device and Location Manager. The adversary
then blocks the valid message from Location Manager
to Device, and immediately resends to Location Man-
ager the first used message from Device to Location
Manager. Since this time the adversary knows the
valid nonces he will exchange to Location Manager in
advance, he can fool Location Manager with the false
round-trip latency shorter than the valid one, and he
can also fool Device with the signed message from
Location Manager containing the false round-trip la-
tency. To prevent this attack, Location Manager must
check that the encrypted (and randomized) Device’s
ID in the first message from Device to Location Man-
ager is different from all previously used ones.
3.2 Positioning with Distance Bound-
ing
By using the distance bounding in the previous sub-
section, we construct a secure positioning mechanism
in line with the previous proposals of [1] [2].
After computing mobile terminal’s location by tri-
angulation with distances estimated by the distance
bounding, we can verify the validity of the computed
location by checking whether the location is inside
a triangle formed by trusted stations, or not. As a
general geometric property, it holds true that on the
plane no point can move to any other point inside a
given triangle without shortening any distance of the
point to triangle’s vertices. Since the distance bound-
ing protocol upper bounds the distances of the mobile
4
terminal to the trusted stations, the above geometri-
cal property reliably prevents the malicious adversary
from modifying the true location information inside
the triangle. The same geometric property holds true
in the relation between a point and a tetrahedron,
instead of a triangle, in 3D space.
In addition to the area test, we check that the error
range of the computed location is below the allowable
level. With all these filtering tests, we extract only
valid positioning results.
But there is a powerful attack to the proposed po-
sitioning scheme with the help of plural wireless ter-
minals. We will discuss the details below.
3.2.1 Collusion Attack
We define the collusion attack as a situation where
plural adversaries share their individual information,
or make use of their individual advantages in a coop-
erative manner, in order to deceive a legitimate en-
tity. In particular, we consider a situation similar to
the one discussed in [2] where the adversary colludes
with plural wireless terminals placed adjacent to the
surrounding trusted stations.
In case of the distance bounding by the challenge-
and-response, each colluded wireless node intercepts
the radio signal from the nearest station as a verifier,
keeps it for an appropriate length of time, and re-
turns it to the station to make the verifier believe ad-
versary’s false distance to the station as true. As dis-
cussed in [2], the previous proposal is secure as long as
the verifier can distinguish adversary’s colluded wire-
less nodes from the adversary himself, which means
that the secret keys for message authentication codes
(MACs) (or the private keys for digital signatures),
and the random nonces for the challenge-and-response
must be securely protected from the adversary.
A variant of the replay attack [5] is shown in Fig.
4. As pointed out in [5], if the adversary ever ob-
tains the valid nonces beforehand, adversary’s wire-
less node adjacent to the station uses the stolen nonce
for the challenge-and-response with the station (veri-
fier) to make the verifier measure the false round-trip
time, reuses verifier’s nonce of the previous challenge-
and-response for the next challenge-and-response with
the mobile terminal (claimant), and results in success-
ful distance falsification by relaying the valid digital
signature from the claimant to the verifier. By this
means, the colluded wireless nodes can adjust their
estimated distances to the nearest station at will in
order to look consistent with adversary’s false loca-
tion even inside the verification triangle.
To prevent this type of colluded man-in-the-middle
attack, a mobile terminal must securely protect a ran-
dom number generator for nonces as well as the secret
keys (or the private keys) for authentication in the
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Fig. 4: Replay attack using a stolen nonce on the dis-
tance bounding with bidirectional communication [5].
The adversarymakes up the false round-trip time with
the stolen nonce. The adversary successfully deceives
the verifier without claimant’s private key for digital
signatures.
tamper-resistant area.
In case of our proposed protocol, even if adversary’s
wireless nodes intercept the radio signal on the way to
the verification module (verifier) of the mobile termi-
nal, all they can do is to lengthen the estimated dis-
tances from the stations but not shorten them, which
results in either the computed location of the mobile
terminal outside the verification triangle, or the com-
puted location of the mobile terminal inside the veri-
fication triangle with the prohibitively enlarged error
range. Our proposal is therefore secure against this
type of attack as long as the mobile terminal protects
its inner clock in the tamper-resistant area.
4 Functional Advantages
4.1 Location Privacy
In our proposal, a mobile terminal need not provide
any information to verify calculated locations because
only unidirectional communication is necessary for the
verification. This gives mobile terminal users a consid-
erable advantage in protecting their location privacy
from the external adversary or the trusted stations.
In contrast, a protocol mainly discussed in [2] uses
bidirectional communication with trusted stations for
authentication, where stations learn how far the mo-
bile terminal is located in each verification procedure
and a central authority checks the validity of those
information. This implies that the mobile terminal
users are monitored by the surrounding stations and
5
the central authority through positioning procedures,
and the protocol has intrinsic difficulty in protecting
the location privacy of the mobile terminal users.
In [2], another protocol designed to protect the loca-
tion privacy is also proposed, where the mobile termi-
nal (or, a tamper-resistant module embedded in the
mobile terminal) as a verifier computes and verifies
its location with distance bounding to the stations.
But it is technically possible for the surrounding sta-
tions to extract considerably accurate location infor-
mation of the mobile terminal from physical proper-
ties of the received radio signals, e.g., propagation di-
rections, strengths, or temporal variations, through
their bidirectional communication.
4.2 Positioning Accuracy
In the previous protocols [1] [2], positioning is based
on the measurements of the round-trip latency of the
radio signal from the stations to the mobile terminal.
The measured time necessarily includes the process-
ing time to prepare the valid response by the mobile
terminal as a claimant, and the uncertainty of the
processing time causes considerable positioning error.
Our protocol with one-way communication is free
from the positioning error caused by the unpredictable
processing-time fluctuations mentioned above, be-
cause the measured propagation time does not include
any intermediate processing time.
Additionally, in the previous protocols using the
challenge-and-response, it is difficult for stations to
measure their distances to the mobile terminal on the
move. Because the receipt time of stations’ challenges
tends to be dispersed when the mobile terminal is
moving, the location of mobile terminal at the time
of distance estimation is easily blurred, which consid-
erably lowers the positioning accuracy. Moreover, if
received plural challenges from stations must be pro-
cessed sequentially to prepare valid responses by the
mobile terminal, it is difficult to predict the total pro-
cessing time of the mobile terminal whose fluctuations
also cause positioning errors.
In our protocol, after the mobile terminal success-
fully receives plural broadcasts from stations and the
precise time of receipt from the inner clock all at once,
the mobile terminal does not have to hurry for posi-
tioning accuracy in the subsequent procedures. To-
day, there are various mobile terminals including GPS
receivers which can receive plural broadcasts simulta-
neously.
4.3 Coverage Area
As for radio communication, the size of the coverage
area depends largely on the intensity of the transmit-
ted radio wave. In bidirectional radio communication,
the size of the coverage area is severely limited by the
poor output power of mobile terminal’s battery. Since
it is technically difficult to increase the output power
of small size batteries, the size of the coverage area
for bidirectional radio communication cannot be en-
larged easily. Hence, if we hope to cover a large area or
outdoors for secure positioning, we need considerable
number of trusted stations.
In contrast, our proposal does not have the above-
mentioned upper limit of the communication distance,
because we only use unidirectional communication
from stations to a mobile terminal. If stations have
affluent power supplies to send a strong radio wave,
the size of the coverage area becomes much larger,
and the number of necessary trusted stations becomes
much less than the that of previous proposals using
bidirectional communication.
4.4 Key Management
As for the mainly discussed proposal in [2], the setting
needs a central authority and a secure backyard net-
work to link between the authority and the stations,
where the authority gathers distance information from
the stations to compute and verify the mobile user’s
location. This means the setting needs an additional
secure key distribution mechanism to maintain the
backyard network, and rather complex key manage-
ment for it, as shown in [2]. On the contrary, our
proposal does not need either a central authority or a
secure backyard network for verification of computed
locations, because in our setting a verification module
in the mobile terminal computes and verifies mobile
terminal’s position by itself. Thus, our proposal also
has an advantage in simple key management.
5 Feasibility Analysis
In our proposal, we assume that a verification module
and a small size inner clock with high-precision are
embedded in the tamper-resistant area of a mobile
terminal, and that they are rigorously protected from
outside entities including a mobile terminal user. We
suppose that a mobile terminal is lent by an authority
to a user. An inner clock in the mobile terminal is kept
isolated from the authority by the time of expiration
when the mobile terminal is returned to the authority.
The authority checks that the mobile terminal has no
irregularities and updates its inner clock.
In the above usage model, the required precision
of the inner clock is roughly approximated with the
relation
c× (δt× T ) ∼ δl , (1)
where c is the velocity of light, δt is the precision of
the inner clock, i.e., the spontaneous time error of the
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inner clock, T is the period of validity of the inner
clock, and δl is the accumulated positioning error due
to δt. Given that T = 30 day with the constant c =
3 × 108 m/s, if we want the accumulated positioning
error δl in the order of 100 m, the required precision
of the inner clock δt should be in the order of 10−10
s/day.
In fact, several clock manufacturers have already
developed small size oven-controlled crystal oscillators
(OCXOs) which narrowly meet the above precision re-
quirement with low power consumption [6] [7] [8] [9].
Their typical long term stability is 5 × 10−10 s/day,
and the accumulated positioning error is about 5 m
according to eq.(1). Those miniaturized OCXOs are
small enough to be incorporated into various types of
mobile terminals, and are now available on the mar-
ket. But the OCXOs are rather sensitive to an ab-
normal environment and external noises, such as me-
chanical fluctuations and the high/low temperature,
which might be a restriction on some special usages
of mobile terminals.
The chip-scale atomic clock developed by NIST is
another promising candidate for the inner clock [10]
[11] [12]. The size of the main unit itself is small
enough to be integrated with RFID tags, and even the
present size of the total system including surrounding
electrical control devices is small enough to be em-
bedded in most mobile terminals [11]. Although the
first reported clock precision (of order 10−8 s/day) [10]
fell short of our requirement above, last year NIST
achieved 5 × 10−11 s/day for the long term stability
[12], i.e., about 0.5 m for the accumulated position-
ing error by eq.(1), which sufficiently meets our re-
quirement. In addition to the above advantage, the
chip-scale atomic clock operates with low power con-
sumption, and is originally designed for low-cost mass
production.
Contrary to cryptographic algorithms and tech-
niques, most tamper-resistant hardware techniques
have been kept secret among developers exclusively,
and there are only limited number of technical liter-
atures available to the public [13]. One well-known
measure for tamper-proofing is to set up a trap to
certainly detect unauthorized operations or intrusions
against the protected area. The detection of the at-
tack immediately triggers to delete the secret data or
break the related hardware functions. The mechanism
may utilize electrical treatments, irreversible chemical
reactions, or mechanical destruction. Another well-
known measure for tamper-proofing is to produce the
protected area with single-chip integration to cut off
the direct contact from outside.
In our proposal, breaking the inner clock itself can-
not be a sufficient countermeasure, because the at-
tacker can freely replace the broken one with his own
high-precision clock. We must either forcibly halt the
function of the verification module or delete secret
identification information as a valid verifier embed-
ded in the protected area. If we choose the chip-scale
atomic clock as an inner clock, single-chip integration
might be an effective countermeasure.
6 Related Work
The secure positioning technique with RF mainly dis-
cussed in this paper was proposed in [1] [2]. The dis-
tance bounding protocols using bidirectional commu-
nication to upper bound claimant’s distance was first
introduced in [3], and the proposal in [2] is based on
the protocols [3]. For easier implementation, a secure
positioning technique with a distance bounding pro-
tocol using ultrasound and radio communication was
proposed in [14], but it has a security vulnerability to
the replay attack due to its use of ultrasound. In [15],
a distance bounding protocol for RFID is proposed.
The protocol uses duplex radio communication, and
is designed to lessen the processing load of RFID as
far as possible.
The protocol called Temporal Leashes is proposed
in [4] for detection of the specific attack called the
wormhole attack. The protocol detects the attack by
checking the packet transmission time measured by
tightly synchronized clocks of a sender and a receiver.
On the other hand, there are location verification
protocols which substantially make use of the physical
properties of broadcasted radio waves [16] [5]. In [16],
their proposal depends on the intensity and the direc-
tivity of broadcasted radio waves for location verifica-
tion. In [5], their proposal with duplex radio commu-
nication assumes spatial isotropic propagation of ra-
dio waves by use of mobile terminal’s omni-directional
antenna, and uses its particular geometric relation for
location verification. But both proposals have a se-
curity vulnerability to malicious modification of the
assumed physical properties of radio waves. There
are many possible ways, especially for a mobile ter-
minal user, to carry out the physical modification of
radio waves, e.g., by fraudulently using a directional
antenna for the mobile terminal, or by surrounding
the mobile terminal with carefully chosen mediums or
materials.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel secure po-
sitioning by use of radio broadcasts as unidirectional
communication. Our proposal is secure as long as
a tamper-resistant module with an inner clock is se-
curely protected. Our proposal has advantages in pro-
tecting the location privacy of mobile terminal users,
improving positioning accuracy, reducing the number
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of trusted stations for a large coverage area, and sim-
plifying key management. On the other hand, our
proposal depends largely on hardware technologies
for a tamper-resistant module and a small size inner
clock with high-precision. But we believe those re-
quirements are not serious restriction on our proposal,
when considering the consecutive advent of various
small size clocks with high-precision.
In the previous proposals [1] [2], a random number
generator for nonces as well as secret keys for encryp-
tion and authentication must be protected even from
a mobile terminal user by a tamper-resistant hard-
ware embedded in the mobile terminal. In our pro-
posal, correspondingly, a high-precision inner clock
must be protected even from a mobile terminal user by
a tamper-resistant hardware embedded in the mobile
terminal.
In the near future, our proposal might be useful
for an autonomous RFID tag integrated with a micro
processor, a small size battery, and a small size high-
precision inner clock, which might play a key role to
guarantee the traceability in wireless networks.
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